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Introduction 
That political life is variable over time with regard 
to style and content is obvious to even the most uninformed. 
The variability of political life is certainly obvious to 
those people who have been observers or participants in 
Canadian local politics over the past twenty or so years. 
The conduct of political behaviour has been altered dramat-
ically in terms of the activity of both official and un-
official actors. The structural nature of local politics in 
much of Canada is somewhat different than it had been, with 
the striking tendency toward regionalized/ centralized gov-
ernmental structures in almost all provinces (with the not-
able exceptions of Saskatchewan and Prince Edward Island, 
and the possible exceptions of Alberta and New Brunswick), 
and with that same tendency being reflected in altered 
provincial-local relations regarding both the allocation of 
jurisdiction (eg planning) and finances. Further, the sub-
stantive nature of local political has also altered signif-
icantly over the past generation so that for most people in 
most localities in Canada the issue agenda of the early 
1980s was quite different from that of the mid to late 
1960s. Whether all, or any, of these changes - in conduct, 
structure and substance are 'significant' depends to some 
extent on the particular locality and to a large extent on 
the perspective of the observer/analyst. 
Regarding the first caveat; it should be recognized 
that notwithstanding a general trend toward regionaliz-
ation/centralization in Canadian politics, there still re-
mains a fundamentally 'local' character to local politics. 
For example, events do not necessarily occur in all local-
ities at the same time, in the same way, or for the same 
reasons. (C.f. Higgins, 1981, passim) Regarding the second 
caveat, there is the common neo-Marxist line of argument 
which holds that changes made to local politics in terms of 
conduct and/or structures are not significant because the 
key substantive issue remains uncrranged and unresolved. 
That issue is usually identified as the (mal)distribution of 
effective political and economic power in an advanced capit-
alist society. (E.g. Goldrick, 1978: and Schecter, 1978) 
Two instances of analyses that, by and large, argue 
along the lines of the second caveat are articles by Matthew 
Kiernan and David Walker, and Lloyd Axworthy. Both articles 
focus on Winnipeg and the effects of the structural reorgan-
ization that occurred in 1971. The creation then of Unicity 
Winnipeg was applauded by numerous academic and other ob-
servers as one of Canada's few real innovations in local 
government and this country's only conscious and serious 
attempt to redistribute local political power. Yet Kiernan 
and Walker state that "major institutional reform has not 
even been attempted in Winnipeg. However, the reforms are 
probably as radical as any that the Canadian political 
culture is capable of digesting." (Kiernan and Walker, 
1983, p. 234) In a similar vein, Axworthy has commented 
that with regard to the lessons one can learn from the 
Winnipeg experience, •· ••• it is obvious that too much is 
expected of ins ti tu tional reform. • •• This provincial tinker-
ing with the machinery of local government seems to be 
thought preferable to undertaking major political action on 
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[such urban ills as] land use, transportation, tax reform, 
and planning." (Axworthy, 1980, p. 42) 
These two appraisals of Unicity Winnipeg raise some 
interesting and important questions about the utility and 
possibility of structural/institutional change having any 
real effect anywhere on anything or anyone at all. It was a 
footnote in the Kiernan and Walker article that raised the 
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issue directly and thus occasioned this paper: 
This debate is one of the most central and persistent in 
the literature on Canadian urban politics. Supporting 
the contention that the structures of local governmentr 
determine political outcomes are such traditional schol-
ars as Rowat and Plunkett. Their perspective has more 
recently received support from contributions by Higgins 
and, in an indirect way, Lightbody. The writers of the 
Canadian 'reform' group, led by James Lorimer, have 
argued that what is important is the ideologies and 
interests of the actors who control the structures. 
(Kiernan and Walker, 1983, footnote 35, p. 251) 
S ever a 1 thing s s truck me about t h a t comment. The ' cent_ r a 1 
and pers is tent' debate was one new to me; I had not under-
stood that I was a party to it; Kiernan and Walker's con-
tention seems promising for exploring the causes of polit-
ical change in terms of outcomes and behaviour; and, such a 
debate and exploration would seem to have applicability to 
Canadian politics at all levels - not just the urban/local 
one - because of a Canadian penchant for structural/instit-
utional description and analysis (for example the long-
dominant traditional stream of writing in Canadian political 
science) and for structural/institutional prescription and 
alteration (eg the now 121-year effort to complete the 
rewriting of the Canadian Constitution and its Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms is still not finished). In other words, 
Canadians seem to devote a perhaps unusually large amount of 
time and energy to analyzing and revising politicsal struct-
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ures, in the presumed belief that political structures do in 
fact matter. Kiernan and Walker challenge that presumption, 
and do so in a way that convinced me, upon reflection, that 
the issue is central and persistent, even though the 'de-
bate' had escaped the notice of me and perhaps a few others. 
The issue is central because what Kiernan and Walker 
are really asking, it seems to me, is "why does political 
change occur?" They do not, of course, use the term "pol-
i tical change" - they refer instead to 'political au tcomes'. 
But one presumes that the political outcomes that involve 
some amount of movement from the status quo are more inter-
esting in their causation than are outcomes that involve no 
change. Posed the way I posed it, the question of why 
political change occurs implies that one who attempts to 
answer it will take into account the instances and patterns 
of political behaviour that had a bearing on the timing, 
direction and specific content of the change. Thus I have 
now modified Kiernan and Walker's implied central question 
somewhat: is it mainly governmental structures that affect 
people's behaviour and produce political change (in terms of 
behavio~r and outcomes) if the structures themselves change, 
or is it mainly the political behaviour and (ideological) 
motivation of elites that effect changes in political out-
comes (including changes to governmental structures) and 
other people's behaviour? 
The causes of political change 
In my view there are several problems with Kiernan and 
Walker's identification of the debate. First, single- cause 
explanations of political and other kinds of social phenom-
Lf-
ena are rarely compelling, including any propositions of the 
sort that political change in terms of outcomes is caused by 
either structures ~ ideologies. The achievement of ideo-
logically-rooted outcomes in policy decisions and/or pat-
terns of political behaviour may well necessitate changes to 
governmental structures. Instead of searching for the caus-
al variable, the quest should be for causal variables and 
the contribution that each of them makes to the resulting 
phenomenon/outcome. Secondly, the last sentence of the above 
quotation from Kiernan and Walker seems to allow no room 
for, or cognizance of, change to governmental structures. 
Instead, the structures of government seem to be assumed to 
be given and stable. Any changes to them appear to be 
assumed to be either irrelevant or largely a waste of time 
and effort. Yet large numbers of Canadian political 
scientists and public officials constantly review govern-
mental structures, and change them with some frequency. One 
presumes that actual or proposed structural change is dir-
ected to some intended and expected end other than structur-
al change for its own sake- that changing such structures 
will or might have some desirable effect on political 
outcomes and/or behaviour. Whether or note, and to what 
extent, those expectations are realistic and capable of 
being fulfilled is another question. The third problem is a 
kind of variant of the first -.there are more than just the 
two possible causal variables which Kiernan and Walker 
identify. In addition to the two they cite (governmental 
structures, and the ideologies and interests of those polit-
ical actors who control the structures) are at least four 
others which come to my mind: 
1) the prevailing political culture, particularly with 
regard to changes in the public's willingness to accept 
political decisions (for example sea tbel t legislation, use 
of cannabis, and bilingualism); 
2) natural and manmade catastrophies (such as 
drought, flood, famine, chemical pollution and highjacking); 
3) technological development (for example satellite 
broadcasting, mass production of the automobile, and the 
invention of the telephone and elevator); and, 
4) real or anticipated changes in economic circum-
stances (such as rates of inflation, unemployment and for-
eign exchange). 
Kiernan and Walker need make no apologies for having 
identified the debate in the manner they did, for their 
comments about it took the form of a mere footnote in an 
article on another subject. Instead, the very fact that 
they identified such a debate at all is, in my view, a 
matter for some congratulation. I suspect that one should 
not interpret their comments to mean that structural change 
has no effect whatsoever on political outcomes and be-
haviour. Nonetheless, their reference to the " ••• bankruptcy 
of institutional reform as an agent of political change" 
(Kiernan and Walker, 1983, p. 234) indicates that the 
authors are obviously highly sceptical about the utility of 
structural/institutional change. 
Axworthy's judgment is somewhat less sceptical, but he 
too perceives limits to·the utility of structural change. 
While he wrote that too much is expected of institutional 
reform, he also wrote that 
this is not to suggest that institutional change should 
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be ignored, as it has played a major role in influencing 
the division of political power. While the basic social 
and political forces are not changed by the instit-
utional system, their form of expression is channelled 
differently by new institutional frameworks, and this 
has a strong impact on the city's policy choices •••• 
Another area in which institutional arrangements can 
be important but little attention is paid to them is in 
the design of structures for dealing with the city's 
intergovernmental arrangements •••• institutional reorg-
anization plays an important role in overcoming the 
growing estrangement between individual citizens and 
government. (Axworthy, 1980, p. 42) 
There is a surprisingly sparse general theoretical 
literature on the causes (and consequences) of political 
change. Most of the existing literature seems to define 
political change as political 'modernization' or 'develop-
ment', phrases which have normative connotations that I do 
not accept as either necessary or appropriate, unless one is 
a believer in the determinedly optimistic Victorian notion 
that "every day in every way the world is getting better and 
better"; in other words, that all change is for the better. 
For example-, despite the promising title of his book (Pol-
itical Continuity and Change), Merkl appears to equate pol-
itical change with 'modernization', and the latter word with 
'democratization'. (Merkl, 1972, pp 353-360 and chapter 
12) It is also clear that Merkl is dealing with 'nations' 
and the movement of them from traditional to modern/devel-
oped/democratic societies. (Merkl, pp 367-74) In that 
sense, Merkl's writing echos that of the political cul-
ture/political development school. (C.£. Almond and Powell, 
1966, especially Chapter XI; and Almond and Verba, 1965, 
especially Chapters I and XIII) None of this literature 
provides much help in exploring linkages at any level of 
political life, especially the local one, between political 
or governmental structures on the one hand and their effects 
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on political behaviour and outcomes. Nor does this liter-
ature contribute much to understanding links between polit-
ical behaviour and outcomes on the one hand and such other 
variables as economic conditions and technological develop-
ment. 
The rest of this paper involves a consideration of the 
causes of changes that have become evident over the past 
thirty years in the nature and conduct of local politics in 
Canada. Because of Kiernan and Walker's contention (sup-
ported in a moderate fashion by Axworthy) that structur-
al/institution change is "bankrupt", the following explores 
it not only as a cause of change but also in terms of its 
consequences- is structural/institutional change really 
irrelevant and a waste of time? My contention is that 
governmental structures matter rather more than Axworthy and 
Kiernan and Walker suggest. I also contend that although 
the ideological perspectives of elites do matter, it is the 
nature of governmental structures and political processes 
that enable certain elites' ideological perspectives to 
prevail. Changing the structures changes (heightens or 
lowers) the extent to which the elites' ideological per-
spectives continue to prevail. That is not only to say, 
however, that structures affect prevailing ideologies - gov-
ernmental structures are prone to being changed by prevail-
ing ideological elites in order to protect and advance their 
dominant position. For example, the electoral system can be 
altered by dominant elites in ways that dissuade viable 
electoral opposition, and creating new government depart-
ments is an obvious and frequently used way in which the 
ideological interests of dominant elites are promoted. 
Further, the retention of obsolete governmental structures 
(such as a non-elective upper house with an effective veto 
over legislation) is also a structural manifestation and 
protector of ideological elites' domination. 
As well as focusing on the causal/consequencial signif-
icance of governmental structures, what follows also ex-
plores another of the list of causes of political change 
cited above - changes (real or anticipated) in economic 
circumstances. Thus rather than being an ~ttempt to explore 
all the possible causes of political change and the effects 
of them on local governmental structures (and vice versa), 
this paper concentrates on the significance of just two 
determinants of changes in local/regional political outcomes 
and behaviour - formal institutions of local (and regional) 
government, and real or anticipated economic circumstances. 
Structural/institutional change: causes and consequences 
In what remains probably the most comprehensive exam-
ination of attempts to restructure local/regional government 
in Canada and of the effects of those attempts, Tindal 
undertook a comparative analysis of efforts to achieve 
structural change in six provinces. (Tindal, 1977) Those 
efforts included New Brunswick's sweeping changes of 1967 
under the rubric of the 'Program for Equal Opportunity'; the 
introduction of two-tiered regional government in Ontario; 
the series of attempts to restructure local government in 
Winnipeg, including the Unicity experfment; the creation of 
regional districts in British Columbia; Quebec's creation of 
second-tier metropolitan councils in Montreal, Quebec and 
Hull-Outaouais and the 'regroupement' program of municipal 
amalgamations; and, the Graham Royal Commission's proposals 
of 1974 to overhaul virtually every aspect of local gov-
ernment (and provincial-local relations) in Nova Scotia. 
In most cases he found a shortfall between the hopes 
for the changes and the results actually achieved. It is 
worth noting briefly some of his conclusions about the 
attempts to restructure local government. Regarding New 
Brunswick's attempts, he wrote "it may be concluded ••• that 
the attempt to abandon local government in the rural areas 
of the province was anything but successful" because direct 
provision of services by the province eventually gave rise 
to other problems such as citizen dissatisfaction with the 
lack of a voice in planning, and because of disparaties in 
taxation between non-incorporated areas and municipalities. 
(p. 20) Ontario's program of creating two-tier regional 
governments was found wanting because of rural areas being 
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over-represented on the regional councils, questions of 
accountability and responsiveness of local government were 
left in doubt because of the indirectly elected nature of 
the upper-tier councils, too little attention was paid to 
the matter of citizen access to local government and the 
appropriate distribution of provincial and municipal res-
ponsibilities, and there was a failure to deal with problems 
of municipal finance. (pp 21-22) Regarding British Col-
umbia's 'regional district' restructuring, Tindal commented 
that there was a lack of public input and discussion of the 
proposed changes (p. 14), and that there was uncertainty 
about the relationship between the municipal councils and 
the regional district boards. (p. 24) Quebec's approaches 
to restructuring local/regional government were described by 
Tindal as " ••• sporadic, of limited ef fee ti veness and devoid 
of any apparent philosophy of local government", particular-
ly with regard to the 'representative' role of local govern-
ment. (p. 17. See also p. 26) Since the Graham Royal 
Commission's recommendations had not begun to be implemented 
by the time Tindal was writing, he offered no comment on 
them. Regarding the Unicity Winnipeg restructuring, Tinda+-
basically restricted himself to noting the Taraska Review 
Committee's comments concerning shortcomings. (pp 31-38) 
However, Tindal added that " •.• conceptual and operational 
problems were experienced with certain features of the leg-
islation. • •• However, the evaula tion of the operating expe r-
ience points up the difficulties inherent in bringing about 
a major change in the concept of the role of local govern-
ment and developing the s true tures and processes necessary 
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to support a new role. " (p. 41) Parenthetically, Tindal's 
description of the Unicity experiment as involving "major 
change" stands in sharp contrast with Kiernan and Walker's 
analysis that "major institutional reform has not even been 
attempted in Winnipeg (Kiernan and Walker, 1983, p. 234), 
and with Axworthy's description of Unicity as a matter of 
provincial "tinkering" with the machinery of local govern-
ment. (Ax worthy, 1 9 8 0 , p. 4 2 ) 
It is important to understand that Tindal gauged the 
relative success or failure of attempted structural changes 
not according to the intended effect's of the changes at-
tempted but according to his own idealized model. (Tindal, 
1977, p. 42. See also his pages 2-4 for a description of 
that model) The point is that assessing the effectiveness 
or success of attempted structural change can be done from 
either of two perspectives; according to the analyst's per-
sonal model or conception of what the ideal structure should 
look like and how it should function, and according to the 
intent or expectations of the architects/implementers of the 
structural change. It would appear that Kiernan and Walker, 
and Axworthy too, have assessed the effectiveness of the 
Unicity Winnipeg structural changes on the same basis as 
Tindal; that is, according to what they personally perceive 
as an ideal, rather than according to the explicit or im-
plicit objectives of those who designed and implemented the 
changes. 
In his conclusion, however, Tindal went beyond compar-
ing the various attempts to restructure local government 
with his idealized model, and offered another basis for 
finding those attempts wanting in their effects/effective-
\2. 
change (however far-reaching or modest it may be), and to 
design and implement the change accordingly. (For the mom-
/ 
ent, I am accepting the general wisdom or assumption that it 
is indeed provincial governments - rather than local govern-
ments themselves - that initiate and implement structural 
change.) But there are really very few instances of explic-
it and publically stated provincial objectives for structur-
al change. That suggests to me that the relatively unsuc-
cessful changes are unsuccessful not because structural 
change can have no (improving) effect but because the change 
has not been sufficiently thought th~ough in design and 
implementation. To illustrate that consciously conceived 
and well executed structural change can have effect, a 
couple of instances are now explored. 
a) Metro Toronto 
The contemporary era of local government in Canada can 
be described as beginning with the creation in 1954 of 
Metropolitan Toronto. Hindsight suggests that the only 
thing that was innovative about Metro Toronto was the ap-
plication in an urban/metropolitan setting of a two-tiered 
county s true ture that for over a century had characterized 
the rural Ontario and some other provinces. Nonetheless, at 
the time of its creation Metro Toronto was widely seen at 
the time in Canada and elsewhere as a novel experiment. 
Two individuals stand out as the principal architects 
of Metro Toronto; Lorne Cumming (then Chairman of the Ont-
ario Municipal Board), and Frederick Gardiner (the first 
Chairman of Metro Toronto). When the Ontario Municipal 
Board rendered its decision on the City of Toronto's 1950 
application to amalgamate the City and the twelve suburban 
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municipalities and on the Town of Mimico's concurrent ap-
plication to create an area-wide special-purpose body, the 
OMB/Cumming not only rejected both applications but pre-
scribed the creation of what became (by provincial legis-
lation) Metro Toronto. (Ontario, 1953) The Cumming Report, 
as the OMB's decision has become known, offered an explan-
ation of the objectives its recommended structural reorgan-
ization was designed to meet, and a rationale of them. 
(Ontario, 1953, pp 43-47) The perceived need for and cause 
of structural reorganization is seen in the Cumming Report's 
comments that 
•.• it can hardly be denied that the principle of local 
autonomy has been of the very essence of the Ontario 
municipal system. When local municipalities which have 
been permit ted, and in fact encouraged to develop under 
this system, find that they have become integral parts 
of a modern metropolitan area where social and economic 
forces beyond their control seriously affect both their 
development and the local resources available ~ finance 
new and pressing needs for municipal services, the 
traditional concept of local autonomy comes into direct 
conflict with an ever increasing need for collective 
municipal action in the interests of the entire area. 
(Ontario, 1953, pp 43-44. Emphasis added) 
The Report noted, however, that it attempted to " ••• exclude 
purely theoretical siderations and to confine its attention 
to the actual situation of the municipalities in the Toronto 
area as disclosed in the evidence, and the special problems 
which concern them and them alone at their present stage of 
development." (p. 47) In other words, the Cumming Report 
relied on pragmatic considerations rather than the kind of 
clear philosophy that Tindal found generally lacking, so 
Tindal would, one presumes, fault the Cumming Report on that 
basis as well. However, it is clear from a reading of it 
that the Cumming Report did have a clear idea of (pragmatic) 
objectives, and designed the new Metro Toronto structure 
according to it. 
The other main architect and driving force behind the 
creation of Metro Toronto was Frederick Gardiner. A former 
reeve of the suburban Village of Forest Hill and a former 
warden of York County, Gardiner was one of nine people 
appointed to the Toronto and Suburban Planning Board which 
was created by the Ontario government in 1946 with respons-
ibility for preparing an official land use plan for the City 
and the twelve surrounding municipalities. Colton has ind-
icated that almost immediately upon hi~ appointment to that 
Planning Board Gardiner became a convert to and advocate of 
some new political structure to facilitate development in 
the Toronto area but without interfering with the existence 
or degree of autonomy that the existing municipalities poss-
essed. (Colton, 1980, pp 59-65) Gardiner was very much 
pro-development, and saw in creation of the new Metro Tor-
onto structure of local government a vehicle that made 
possible development of a kind that could not be achieved 
under the pre-1954 structure. More specifically, Gardiner 
saw transportation in terms of expressways and subways as 
both 'developments' in their own right and as prerequisites 
to large scale building construction projects in the down-
town core core as well as in the residential suburbs. The 
politically fragmented structure of local government that 
existed up to 1954 made it well nigh impossible to build the 
series of expressways he considered necessary and desirable. 
Creating the Metro Toronto structure, with upper-tier re-
sponsibility for major roads, capital borrowing, and area-
wide planning, made expressway and subway construction poss-
l~ 
i ble. While Gardiner's own objectives underlying his desire 
for structural ch&nge were somewhat different from Cum-
ming's, the two sets were certainly compatible. 
The provincial legislation that created Metro Toronto 
in 1954 followed closely almost all the recommendations of 
Mr. Cumming. The legislation also specified that a review 
of the new structure's performance was to be conducted 
within five years. In appointing Lorne Cumming to conduct 
that review, the provincial government signified, in effect, 
its general satisfaction with the new structures. And, not 
surprisingly, Cumming's review report of 1958 hailed the 
Metro structures as an overwhelming success and recommented 
no fundamental changes to it. (Ontario, 1958) Change in 
the political behaviour of elected and appointed officials 
and in political outcomes had occurred (witness the mammoth 
program of expressway and subway construction), and I think 
it can soundly be argued that that behaviour and those 
outcomes were indeed a consequence of the structural 
changes. Numerous academic and other analysts have express-
ed serious criticism of the Metro Toronto structure. And 
the Goldenberg and Robarts review commissions' reports of 
1965 and 1977 respectively) have criticized aspects of the 
1954 structure and subsequent modifications to it. But 
those criticisms do not detract from the fact that the 
structural changes did affect political behaviour and out-
comes, and those effects have tended to be in the direction 
intended and desired by Cumming and Gardiner. 
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b) Unicity Winnipeg 
Whether the Unicity Winnipeg experiment of 1971 is 
judged to have been the "major change" that Tindal found it 
to be, or a matter of "tinkering" as Axworthy maintained, it 
certainly was a significant innovation in the history of 
Canadian local government. And it has received almost as 
much published attention - both acclaim and criticism - as 
the Metro Toronto structure has received. 
Of all the reports and statements of intent published 
by provincial governments before beginning to restructure 
local government, the Manitoba government's White Paper of 
late 1970 stands out as being by far the most explicit, 
comprehensive, and detailed statement of philosophical ex-
planation of intent/objectives. (Manitoba, 1970) Although 
a book has been published (Brownstone and Plunkett, 1983) 
which documents in much detail the process involving in 
preparing the White Paper and the discussions between prov-
incial cabinet ministers and the consultants who were en-
gaged to design the new structure, the source of inspiration 
for some of the major ideas incorporated into the White 
paper remain obscure. Certainly there were no Canadian 
precedents for a Unicity-like structure, and only very loose 
connections can be made to any developments in Britain or 
the United States. The best guess is that the Italian city 
of Bologna was the inspiration. 
As is well known, the basic characteristic of the 
Unicity Winnipeg structure in 1971 was the coupling of 
administrative centralization (via complete amalgamation of 
all the area municipalities into one huge new one) with 
political decentralization (via the creation of "community 
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committees" as standing committees of city council, and 
their companion "resident advisory groups"). The purpose of 
administrative centralization was to resolve a number of 
problems by rationalizing and making more efficient the 
provision of services throughout Winnipeg, to standardize 
levels of services, to establish a single tax base and tax 
structure, to end competition among the existing municipal-
ities, and to unify civic administration. It was the at-
tempt to structure political decentralization that was nov-
el, and that then became problematic and a main source of 
criticism. 
The nature of the intended political decentralization 
and the reason why it was thought to be desirable and im-
portant are revealed in a memorandum that Brownstone wrote 
to the provincial cabinet in 1970: 
••• the political (participatory) aspects are highly 
unsatisfactory at present and ••• any reorganized form will 
need to include a meaningful attack on this problem •••• it 
will be necessary to design an effective,- acceptable, 
political decentralization providing for involvement of 
citizens on a scale and intensity which exceeds by far that 
which is in existence at present. 
What is assumed here has more to do with community 
organization, animation, control and advocacy, all of which 
require not only policies but supportive resources. 
(quoted in Brownstone and Plunkett, 1983, p. 39) 
The community committees and resident advisory groups were 
the twin mechanisms designed for this end. The former were 
to have the role of both providing detailed administrative 
control of those services peculiarly local in character, and 
serving as a general contact between city council as a whole 
and citizens over the whole range of city functions and 
services. Depending on ones perspective, the White Paper 
was either rather vague or provided considerable flexibility 
about the RAGs, for little was specified about the compos-
ition, basis for selection, or functions of them. It is 
clear that the RAGs were intended to foster grass-roots 
participation between civic elections, and the RAGs were 
also intended to "assist" generally the community commit-
tees. The designers of the new structure were, seemingly, 
aware that the structure they designed had some limitations, 
noting that the combination of community committees and RAGs 
" ••• will lead to a relationship between councillors and 
citizens which should include a high level of participation 
and a high level of citizen control. [But] it should be 
noted parenthetically that participation and control do not 
flow automatically from this structural arrangement but will 
require special attention." (Brownstone and Plunkett, 1983, 
p. 45) How right they were, for more published criticism 
has since been leveled at this aspect of the Unicity re-
structuring than at any other. 
Beyond the two thrusts of administrative centralization 
and political decentralization, there was a third major 
objective, although it seems to have been a hidden agenda 
item for it went unacknowledged in the White Paper. That 
was to make the ground in Winnipeg fertile to the develop-
ment of a party system and more specifically, one presumes, 
to improve the civic electoral prospects of NDP candidates 
to city council. The structural aspects designed toward 
that end included a council that would be unusually large by 
Canadian standards so as to allow the formatio~ of govern-
ment and opposition blocs of councillors, the provision that 
the mayor would be selected by the largest bloc of council-
lors after each election rather than being directly elected, 
2.0 
and creating a powerful Executive Policy Committee that 
would be analogous to a cabinet. 
1972, 
ly in 
For a time after Unicity came into full operation in 
there were changes in political behaviour, and probab-
political outcomes too. The first series of meetings 
to select members of the resident advisory groups brought 
out many hundreds of citizens, at least some of whom must 
have been newcomers to citizen group activity. However, 
scepticism expressed by a number of observers (eg Axworthy, 
1972) about the prognosis was well founded, for the levels 
of public participation waned quite dramatically over time. 
(c.f. Wichern, 1975) During a month of research in Winnipeg 
in 1979, I found very little evidence indeed of even a 
continued existence of the RAGs, let alone any sign of their 
wielding effective citizen control. 
In accordance with the provincial legislation that 
created the Unicity structure, a review of its functioning 
was begun in 1975 and reported in 1976. (Manitoba, 1976) 
The Taraska Report generally found the Unicity structure to 
be working well with regard to the objective of administ-
rative centralization, particularly noting the unified ad-
ministratiun, single tax base, and standardized municipal 
services. But deficiencies were also found, including a lack 
of leadership, lack of accountability, confusion of roles 
and responsibilities, low staff morale, complicated and 
cumbersome approval processes, narrow parochialism among the 
councillors, and neglect of large-scale citywide policies by 
council. (Manitoba, 1976, p. 134) Two of the most important 
changes recommended by the Taraska committee - to have the 
mayor selected by and from among elected councillors, and to 
0..\ 
strengthen the executive policy committee and the mayor's 
control over it - were what Brownstone and his fellow de-
signers had designed in the first place. 
In recommending a reduction in the size of city council 
from fifty-one members to thirty-nine, the Taraska Report 
was limiting the possibility of the development of the 
party/parliamentary system that was originally intended, but 
even a council of thirty-nine would be large by Canadian 
standards and would be sufficiently large to enable govern-
ment and opposition blocs of councillors to form. It is 
probably fair to say that the thrust of Unicity which the 
Taraska committee found weakest was that of political de-
centralization (to encourage citizen participation). The 
Report recommended cutting in half (from twelve to six) the 
number of community committees and resident advisory groups, 
and thereby doubling their size. Additionally, it was re-
commended that the community committees and RAGs be 
strengthened by making them responsible primarily for pre-
paring and amending district plans. Parenthically, there 
seems a certain irony in both cutting the number of commun-
ity committees and RAGs in half, and at the same time giving 
them something significant to do; the former would tend to 
inhibit citizen participation, while the latter would tend 
to make participation more worthwhile. 
Subsequent to the Tar ask a Report, the provincia 1 go v-
ernment did modify the Unicity structure but not entirely in 
the ways that had been recommended. The number of community 
committees and RAGs was indeed cut in half, but instead of 
granting them some power the provincial government reduced 
their role even further. As in 1971, the provincial govern-
ment failed to require that the mayor be selected by and 
from among the elected councillors, a failure which effect-
ively doomed the prospects for achieving the party/parlia-
mentary objective. The achievement of that objective, as 
well as the objective of political decentralization, was 
made even less possible by the provincial government's dec-
ision to cut down the size of city council to not just the 
thirty-nine recommended by the Taraska Committee but even 
more - to only twenty-nine. 
Brownstone and Plunkett have cr~ticized the changes 
made in 19 77 as greatly weakening the demo era tic/ particip-
atory potential of the original system (Brownstone and Plun-
kett, 1983, p. 140), and Kiernan and Walker more damningly 
maintain that "the 1977 amendments represent an abandonment 
of the government's original objectives [to politicize local 
government via decentralization and participation] in favour 
of the more traditional goals of local government reorganiz-
ation: efficiency and rationalization." 
er, 1983, p. 239) 
(Kiernan and Walk-
Responsi hili ty for the relative failure subsequent to 
1971 of two of the three thrusts - political decentraliz-
ation and a party/parliamentary form of government - can 
only partially be laid at the feet of Brownstone and his 
fellow designers of Unicity. Clearly, the design of the 
resident advisory groups involved little of substance worth 
their doing, and the design was certainly complex and thus 
perhaps not easily understood by the public. Because the 
RAGs were to have no clear and ef f ec ti ve powers, they would 
lack legimitacy in the minds of some civic bureaucrats and 
Conceptually, I can think of four possible reasons why 
changes are made to structures or institutions of government 
at any level, including the local/regional one. They are: 
1) to modernize archaic governmental structures so as 
to bring them into conformity with the evolving political 
culture, especially in terms of the general public's con-
temporary patterns of political behaviour and expectations 
concerning both the processes by which official decisions 
are made and the substantive content of those decisions; 
2) to protect or entrench the power and influence of a 
d o m i nan t m i n o r i t y I e 1 i t e i n t e r e s t , i n .t he f a c e o f a r e a 1 o r 
anticipated challenge to its continued domination; 
3) to encourage or foster new patterns of political 
behaviour by and/or expectations of the general public; and, 
4) to facilitate or force the making of new political 
decisions by elected and/or appointed public officials. 
Economic conditions as a determinant ~ political change 
This part of the paper is necessarily short, primarily 
because of the considerable difficulty I encountered in 
obtaining reliable and useful indicators of economic con-
ditions in Canadian cities over time,. and partly because of 
the difficulty of analyzing the data I was able to obtain. 
To my knowledge, no explicit and comprehensive analysis 
of the effects of economic conditions on Canadian local 
political behaviour and outcomes has been attempted in a way 
that parallels Tindal's examination of structural change. 
However, the existing literature does provide some hints, at 
least, that are worth further exploration. For example, 
with reference to the contemporary urban reform movement, 
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Goldrick has written that 
The real importance of reform in the 1960s and 
1970s was that it occurred as a response to fundamental 
changes that were taking place in the profit-making or 
accumulation needs of finance capital; consequences that 
encroached upon the middle-class liberal values of those 
who dominated reform in the period. (Goldrick, 1978, p. 
29) 
and his premise was that 
•.• the city is developed, redeveloped and moulded 
over time according to long-term cycles in how profits 
are made and investment decisions taken •••• City gov-
ernments mediate the needs of finance capital by provid-
ing services and regulations which support its object-
ives. (Goldrick, 1978, p. 30) 
The "fundamental changes" to which h~ referred had to do 
particularly with property development especially during 
booming economic times; in particular finance capital's 
needs for the supply (at public expense) of such infrastruc-
ture as roads and other transportation systems, sewers, 
water and power supplies, as well as planning and zoning 
regulations to support the (profit-centred) objectives of 
finance capital and its investment decisions. Goldrick also 
indicated that finance capital needed cities to prevent 
working- c 1 ass are as adjacent to the centra 1 city from 
blighting the new investments being built, and that whole-
sale slum clearance, public housing and the enforcement of 
housing standard by-laws were consequential political out-
comes. (1978, pp 30-32) In other words, Goldrick does 
posit a connection between economic conditions (in a cap-
italist society) on the one hand, and the political behav-
iour of public officials and their decision outcomes on the 
other. 
Related to Goldrick's thesis is the quite large and 
influential body of literature that has traced the political 
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power and effects of the property development industry in 
Canada. (c.£. Lorimer, 1970, esp. Chapter Six; Lorimer, 
1972, esp. Part II; Lorimer, 1978; Lorimer, 1981; and Gut-
stein, 1975) Put (too) simply, this literature demonstrates 
that the property development industry grew amazingly in 
size, profitability and political power between roughly the 
end of the Second World War and the late 1970s. It did so 
by virtue of the economic policies and strategies (especial-
ly regarding housing and the financing of construction) of a 
sympathetic and encouraging federal government, along with 
the provincial governments. As well, that industry succeed-
ed in directing the building regulation and approval funct-
ions, and the budgetary processes of municipal councils 
across the whole country. Expressing awe about the prop-
erty I land development indus try, Lori mer described it as an 
"amazing and impressive success story", but, prophetically, 
he wrote 
Yet at the same time the development industry itself is 
now a threat to the properity and wealth of the country. 
It has got out of hand. Its success cannot - and should 
not- last. (Lorimer, 1978, p. 264) 
Lorimer wrote that in 1978, shortly before the property 
development industry indeed fell on hard times. In 1981, 
Lorimer wrote that 
Canada's cities have entered a new period in their 
history. The era of the developers - of rapid urban 
growth, high-rise towers springing up everywhere, 
suburbs gobbling thousands of acres of farmland, 
shopping centres and expressways spreading over the 
countryside- is over. (Lorimer, 1981, p. 6) 
and Lorimer identified changes in the basic structure of the 
Canadian economy as "the most fundamental" cause of the 
industry's dramatic decline. (1981, p. 7) The industry 
certainly did decline in terms of its economic health, but 
it is by no means certain that its political power also 
declined. 
Booming economic times, and economic recessions, are 
thought to have no only obvious effects on governmental 
outputs/outcomes and thus the political behaviour of public 
officials, but on the political behaviour of the· public too. 
At the federal and provincial levels of politics, for ex-
ample, "third" parties of political protest tend to emerge 
in times of economic depression/recession (eg Social Credit 
in Alberta and formation of the national CCF. both during 
the Great Depression of the 1930s). In local politics, 
booming and declining economic times are manifested by the 
amount of construction activity, and it is that activity (or 
the lack of it) that can be linked to the incidence of many 
neighbourhood groups. It is a truism to say that such 
groups typically emerge during period of economic boom, 
during which companies propose new development projects and 
municipalities undertake large-scale construction of such 
infrastructure as major roadways. Some of those projects 
are perceived as presenting social and economic threats to 
existing neighbourhoods, and the formation of community 
action groups to fight them is the normal response. During 
times of economic depression/recession, the threats are less 
frequent and thus neighbourhood groups tend to fade away. 
It is virtually self-evident, then, that the political be-
haviour of some portion of the public and of public offic-
ials, and local political outcomes too are a affected by 
economic conditions and changes in them over time. 
How does one measure changes in economic conditions 
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over time? Particularly, what kind of indicators are there 
that enable one to analyze links between economic conditions 
and political behaviour and outcomes ~ city over time? 
Since economic conditions are not uniform in cities across 
the country at any one period of time (eg the last property 
development boom lasted somewhat longer in Calglary and 
Edmonton than it did in other cities), it is necessary to 
use economic indicators that enable one to compare cities at 
certain points in time, and that also cover a reasonably 
long span of time. Eventually, I had to settle on only one 
indicator, but am satisfied that it is'a particularly good 
one. It is the value of building permits issued annually, 
and it proved possible (with much time and effort) to com-
pile them on an annual basis for each metropolitan centre in 
Canada. Tables 1, 2 and 4 summarize the situation for 
fourteen metropolitan centres between 1966 and 1984 (but 
figures are not included for 1967 and 1969). I have plotted 
the figures on a series of graphs, of which three examples 
are appended. The three are Calgary (which shows extreme 
volatility), Halifax (which shows some volatility) and Tor-
onto (which is less volatile). 
The task now is to try to connect the nature of eco-
nomic conditions (and any changes in them) to individual 
cities/metropolitan areas. Before doing so, I have devel-
oped a number of hypotheses. The most obvious one is that 
the public's political behaviour in terms of citizen group 
activity and perhaps voting in civic elections varies dir-
ectly with any changes in the annual value of building 
permits issued in a particular metropolitan centre. Thus if 
~0 
economic conditions are volatile, so too will be the pub-
lie's political behaviour. The second hypothesis to test is 
that aside from economic volatility, the relative wealth of 
a city (as measured by the per capital annual value of 
building permits issued) has a bearing on political activ-
ity, in that if political activity by citizens is the "lux-
ury" it is sometimes thought to be, then it is citizens in 
the wealthier cities that can best afford the luxury and 
that will be politically active. Table 3 shows the per 
capital annual value of building permits issued in 1971 and 
1981 for fourteen of the metropolitan centres. 
(George Betts and Alan Artibise: please note 
that this is as far as I got as of noon on 
August 7) 
File: build. cap Table l 
City 
-
Calgary 
Edrcrlton 
Ha 1 ifax 
Hamilton 
Londoo 
tvbltrea 1 
Ottawa 
St. John 
St. John's 
Toronto 
Vancouver 
Victoria 
Windsor 
Winnipeg 
National 
vv 
(V 
value of buildin9 permits issued, by metro area, by year ($000) 
1966 1968 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1900 1981 1982 1983 1984 
114,637 183,%4 100,910 193,335 219,2M 240,484 273,373 391,313 447,817 004,081 1,052,743 1,103,037 1,394,374 2,445,479 1,051,459 410,622 398,415 
140,656 181,723 134,226 223,997 241,228 254,684 316,024 394,968 618,533 744,143 938,166 985,886 1,269,933 1,374,132 919,515 688,588 378, 7ffJ 
37' 165 56,482 45,874 48,078 108,332 106,403 138,183 170,593 128,ffJ9 167,307 154,858 131,348 115,553 168,325 171,892 261,004 313,865 
100,979 118,527 105,477 122,478 168,733 204,776 228,300 277,126 209,470 214,582 183,432 200,874 218,555 223, 788 100,033 252,321 289,259 
5),975 63,845 69,107 84,641 109,852 128,728 120,193 129,102 125,292 132,975 140,898 113,429 97,705 143,084 166,5)7 150,800 146,927 
452,536 551,303 428,225 516,808 640,218 886,643 986,751 1,109,303 1,427,874 1,142,981 869,904 1,001,065 1,159,378 1,577,058 1,244,772 1,564,279 1,875,840 
151 '930 162,373 276,100 247,527 285,066 336,071 324,119 304,543 305,330 342,856 329,241 268,489 264,686 415,714 446,148 633,203 889,759 
10, 137 20,299 25,482 48,ffJ3 30,136 42,785 47,082 74, 789 65,625 38, 193 43,165 79,245 56,328 64,850 28,288 87,926 78,577 
26,%3 27,944 16,786 21,~3 17,714 69,455 40,172 39,279 49,437 66,687 53,4ffi 679,978 103,248 115,795 72,524 %,290 89,&18 
697,009 730,451 926,834 1,141,412 1,328,843 1,924,634 1,618,794 1,835,372 1,566,326 1,659,256 1,770,014 1,861,782 2,288,250 2,~1.731 2,118,919 2,729,239 3,052,924 
195,762 273,600 253,469 404,384 440,gj7 638,445 582,002 702,950 846,855 850,533 009,838 1,065,222 1 ,462, 725 1' 597' 103 1,247,841 1 '340,<XX) 1 ,2&l,510 
35, 182 55,559 52,469 84,537 95,799 119,913 162,111 177,476 201,660 162,664 143,372 158,960 259,107 326,735 166,993 195,588 176,429 
ffJ,051 69,451 81,386 81,662 85,429 81,622 116,591 82,446 92,250 128,047 177,~3 242,623 146,321 66,170 52,627 93,792 83,~7 
93,621 148,861 138,267 151,659 178,271 171,142 211,200 220,639 347,520 324,658 391,553 263,125 213,288 269,264 206,637 349,145 423,731 
2,332,827 2,%9,059 3,048,612 3,878,920 4,644, 785 5,994,207 6,046,481 6,970,055 7,822,282 8,066,459 8,358,117 8,930, 771 10,232,440 13,118,%5 9,()]3,470 10,298,366 11,154,648 
"{"· .·ttt:fti'fifiz!t~""dtft"titVztzdH~ig¥'*''fxW'ittftt&w+·tp Tt&ttftt. .,.; .. ,:i't ·· ·;-,"~'. 1 1 ..• *' , Yr * ··~· ~~--· ------
File: nat. percent Table 2 
Percenta~e of value of national metro area building permits 
City '66 '68 }70 issued, b~ metro area, bv year '71 '72 73 '74 '75- J76 '77 '78 !'79 "80 '81 '82 '83 '84 
Calgary 4.9 6.2 5.9 5.0 4. 7 4.0 4.5 5.6 5.7 10.0 12.6 12.4 13.6 18.6 11.6 4.0 3.6 
Edmonton 6.0 6. 1 4.4 5.8 5.2 4.2 5.2 5. 7 7.9 9.2 11.2 11.0 12.4 10.5 10. 1 6.7 3.4 
Halifax 1. 6 1. 9 1. 5 1. 2 2.3 1. 8 2.3 2.4 1. 6 2. 1 1. 9 1. 5 1 . 1 1. 3 1. 9 2.5 2.8 
Hamilton 4.3 4.0 3.5 3.2 3.6 3.4 3.8 4.0 2.7 2.7 2.2 2.2 2. 1 1. 7 2.0 2.5 2.6 
London 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.4 2. 1 2.0 1.9 1.6 1. 6 1. 7 1.3 1. 0 1 . 1 1. 8 1. 5 1. 3 
Montreal 19.4 18.6 14.0 13.3 13.8 14.8 16.3 15.9 18.3 14.2 10.4 11. 2 11.3 12.0 13.7 15.2 16.8 
Ottawa 6.5 5.5 9. 1 6.4 6.1 5.6 5.4 4.4 3.9 4.3 3.9 3.0 2.6 3.2 4.9 6.1 8.0 
St. John .4 . 7 .8 1. 3 .6 . 7 . 8 1 . 1 .8 . 5 . 5 . 9 . 6 . 5 • 3 . 9 . 7 
St. John's 1.2 . 9 • 6 . 6 . 4 1. 2 . 7 . 6 • 6 .8 . 6 .8 1. 0 • 9 .8 . 9 .8 
Toronto 29.9 24.6 30.4 29.4 28.6 32. 1 26.8 26.3 20.0 20.6 21.2 20.8 22.4 22. 1 23.3 26.5 27.4 
Vancouver 8.4 9.2 8.3 10.4 9.~ 10.7 9.6 10. 1 10.8 10.5 9. 7 11. 9 14.3 12.2 13.7 13.0 11 . 5 
Victoria 1. 5 1. 9 1. 7 2.2 2. 1 2.0 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.0 1. 7 1. 8 2.5 2.5 1. 8 1. 9 1. 6 
Windsor 2.6 2.3 2.7 2. 1 1. 8 1.4 1. 9 1. 2 1. 2 1. 6 2.1 2.7 1. 4 . 5 . 6 . 9 .8 
Winni~eg 4.0 5.0 4.5 3.9 3.8 2.9 3.5 3.2 4.4 4.0 4.7 2.9 2.1 2. 1 2.3 3.4 3.8 
National 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
\IV 
w 
File: PER. CAPITA Table 3 
value of building :eermits issued 4 At 
ea, 1971 and 1981 
1981 
City Percap Pop $ Percap 
I 
Calgary 193,335 403,300 479 2,445,479 592,700 4, 126 
Edmonton· 223,997 495, 700 452 1' 374,132 657,100 2,091 
Ha 1 if ax 48,078 222,600 216 168,325 277.700 606 
Hamilton 122,478 498,500 246 223,788 542,100 413 
London 84,641 286,000 296 143,084 283,700 504 
Montreal 516,808 . 2, 743,200 188 1' 577' 058 2,828,300 558 
Ottawa 247,527 602,500 411 415,714 718,000 579 
St. John 48,603 106,700 456 64,850 114,000 569 
St. John's 21,903 131,800 166 115,795! 154,800 748 
Toronto 1 '141 '412 i 2' 628' 000 434 2, 901,731 ! 2, 998,900 968 
Vancouver 404,384 1,082,300 374 1, 597. 103 1 '268, 200 1,259 
Victoria 84, 537 i 195,800 432 326,735 233,500 1,399 
Windsor 81 '662 . 258, 600 316 66,170 246, 100 269 
~ ... ·.·. Winni e 151. 659 i 540,300 281 269,264 ' 584,800 460 
rile: BASE66 
City 
Calgary 160 
Edmonton 129 
Halifax 152 
Hamilton 117 
London 125 
Mont rea 1 122 
Ottawa 107 
St. John 200 
St. John's104 
Toronto 105 
Vancouver 140 
Victoria 158 
Windsor 116 
Winn~ 159 
National 127 i 
"" V\ 
158 
95 
123 
104 
136 
95 
182 
251 
62 
133 
129 
149 
136 
148 
131 _j_ 
169 
159 
129 
121 
166 
114 : 
I 163 : 
479 
81 
164 
207 
240 . 
136 
162 i 
166 J 
,' 
------'-"'"--------'' 
Table 4 
Growth/decline in value of building permits issued 
by metro area, by year, relative to 1966 (1966 = 100) 
192 
172 
291 
167 : 
216 
141 
188 
297 
66 
190 
225 
272 
142 
190 
199-] 
I 
210 i 
181 
286 
203 
253 
196 
221 
422. 
258 
276 
326 ! 
341 ~ 
136 ! 
183 
257 I 
238 ' 
225 1 
372 
226 
236 
218 I 
213 I 
464 
149 
232 
297 
461 
194 
226 
259 I 
341 
281 
459 
274 ' 
253 
245 
200 
738 
146 
263 
359 
504 
137 
236 
299 i 
391 . 
440 ! 
346 
207 
246 
316 
201 
647 
183 
224 
433 . 
573 i 
154 
371 . 
335 i 
701 
529 
450 
213 
261 
253 
226 
377 
247 
238 
434 
462 
213 
347 
346 
918 
667 
417 
182 i 
276 
192 
217 
426 I 
198 
254 
414 
408 
296 
418 
358 I 
962;1,216 2,1331 
701 ' 903 977 : 
353 , 311 , 453 I 
199 216 : 222 
223 192 I 281 
221 256 : 348 
177 174 ! 274 
782 556 : 640 ' 
260 383 . 429 i 
267 328 416 
544 . 747 816 
452 736 929 
404 244 110 . 
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917 
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